Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law by Sellers, Mortimer
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 86 | Issue 1 Article 2
1997
Republicanism, Liberalism, and the Law
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Law and Society Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation




VOLUME 86 1997-98 NUMBER 1
ARTICLE
Republicanism,
Liberalism, and the Law
BY MORTIMER SELLERS*
INTRODUCTION
"[A] republic signiffies] only a government, m which all men,
rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers andpeople, masters and
servants, the first citizen and the last, are equally subject to the
laws. [I]t signifie[s] a government, m which the property of the
public, or people, and of every one of them, [is] secured and protected
by law. This idea implies liberty; that the property and liberty
of all men, not merely of a majority, should be safe; for the people, or
public, comprehends more than a majority, it comprehends all and every
individual; and the property of every citizen is a part of the public
property, as each citizen is a part of the public, people, or community."
John Adams'
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International and
Comparative Law, Umversity of Baltimore School of Law. A.B., J.D., Harvard;
B.C.L., D.Phil., Oxford.
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M uch recent scholarship contrasts republicanism with liberalismas th  two entral and contradictory ideals of modem legal
and constitutional thought.2 Some lawyers contrast the liberalism that
regards legislation as a necessary evil with republican visions of cultural
self-expression through law.3 This misstates the historical origins and
best usage of both terms. Properly understood, republicanism and
liberalism do not conflict, and both endorse law as the necessary vehicle
of social justice. Republicanism is the parent of liberalism in Western
Europe. They share a fundamental commitment to liberty and differ only
m their relative ambition. Liberalism grew out of republican theory and
has never found stability or security without the protection of republican
structures of government.
I. REPUBLICANISM
By "republicanism" I mean the legal theory of republican Rome, as
revived m renaissance Italy, restated in commonwealth England, realized
m George Washington's North America, and reanimated by the French
revolution.4 The most important authors m this tradition include
Polybius, Marcus Tullius Cicero, Titus Livy, Niccol6 Machiavelli, James
Harrington, Algernon Sidney, John Adams, James Madison, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.5 Essential elements of a republican legal system
include (in approximate order of inportance): (1) pursuit of the common
good, through (2) popular sovereignty and (3) the rule of law, under (4)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 159-60 (1788).
2 See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTs AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,
1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERiCA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); Jirgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the
Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism, XCII J.
OF PHIL. 127-128 (1995); John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, XCII J. OF PHIL. 179
(1995); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American
Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv 57 (1987-1988); Symposium,
The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Symposium, Roads
Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional
Theory, 84 Nw. U. L. REv 1 (1989); Symposium, 41 FLA. L. REV 409 (1989).
3 See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 73.
4 See M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Liberty, in JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY
(Sun Ratnapala & G.A. Moens eds., 1996).
' See Mortimer Sellers, The Republican Legal Tradition, INT'L J. OF
CLASS. TRAD. (forthcoming 1997).
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a mixed and balanced government comprising (5) a deliberative senate,
(6) an elected executive, and (7) a popular assembly or representative
lower house in the legislature.6 This system secures "liberty," a word that
entered Western political vocabulary to describe the status of citizens
protected by republican institutions.7 Republican liberty signifies
government in pursut of the common good, where no citizen is subjected
to the unfettered will of another!
The central meaning of republican government since Cicero has been
legislation for the "respublica" or common good of the people.' Popular
sovereignty follows because the people or 'populus" itself constitutes the
fairest judge of public welfare - unfettered magistrates and factions will
pursue their own interests instead.' ° The rule of law constrains the
people and magistrates from favoring private interests in specific
litigation." The elected "senate" or upper chamber in the legislature,
serving for long terms, moderates the swings of popular emotions.' 2 The
public assembly controls the usurpations of the senate, and vice versa."3
So the mixed republican structure of government balances magistrates
against the senate and people (or their representatives) to preserve the
liberty of the whole.14 If any single faction, including the majority of the
people, should seize power, liberty would be lost, the common good
forgotten, and the republic gone, until balance is restored."
6 See M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN
Tm UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 6-245 etpassm (1994).
' See Sellers, supra note 4; see also Trrus Livius, AB URBE CONDrrA
11.1.1-2 (n.p., n.d.); George Washington, The First Inaugural Speech (Apr. 30,
1789), in GEORGE WASINGTON: A COLLECTION 462 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988).
8 See ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 1.5
(1698); I ADAMS, supra note 1, at xxvi,123.
9 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA I.xxv.39. "[R]es publica
res populi, populus autem non omms hommum coetus quoquo modo congregatus,
sed coetus multitudims iuns consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus." Id.
10 "[I]taque nulla alia m civitate, msi m qua populi potestas suimma est,
ullum domicilium libertas habet." Id. at I.xxxi.47 "[Q]uodsi liber populus
deliget, quibus se committat, deligetque, si modus salvus esse vult, optimum
quemque, certe in optimorum consiliis posita est civitatium salus "Id. at
I.xxxiv.51.
" See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS H.xii.42 (n.p., n.d.).
12 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 1.xii.27-28 (n.p., nd).
,3 See CICERO, supra note 9, at II.xxxi.53-56.
,4 See id. at lI.xxiii.41, II.xxxiii.57
'" See id. at mI.xxxii.44-xxxiii.45.
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When any one element in this republican formula of government is
missing, there is no republic, in the usual sense of the term, because
(republicans believe) the common good and liberty cannot be preserved.
Popular sovereignty without balance is simple democracy, and no
republic - the majority will abuse unprotected minorities;' 6 the rule of
law can advance the tyranny of despots;' 7 and senators and magistrates
may exploit their authority m the manner of Caesar, the Long Parliament,
Cromwell, or Napoleon." So although republicans praise and require
popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and balanced government, no one
of these by itself is fully "republican" without the others. All exist to
promote the common good, and to prevent "corruption" in the govern-
ment or courts.' 9
II. LIBERALISM
"Liberalism" as such was not. known before the nineteenth century
and first emerged in the wake of the French revolution to accommodate
those partisans of liberty who, having reconciled themselves to constitu-
tional monarchy, could not be "republicans" any longer, m the strictest
sense of the term.20 Tis required a new conception of liberty, articulat-
ed most influentially in 1819 by Benjamin Constant m his speech
distinguishing the "liberty of the ancients" from the "liberty of the
modems."2' Constant defined the liberty of the ancients as actual
16 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
'7 See I ADAMs, supra note 1.
18 See id. at iv; 365-371. Cf. "Cato" (pseudonym for John Trenchard &
Thomas Gordon), Letter No. 25 (Apr. 15, 1721), in CATO'S LETTERS OR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY, CivIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 179-88
(Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995) (1720-23) [hereinafter CATO'S LETTERS] ("All
should proceed by fixed and stated rules, and upon any emergency, new rules
should be made. This is the constitution, and this is the happiness of Englishmen
"Id. at 186).
"Corruption" is a techmcal term in republican discourse, denved from
Roman political vocabulary, meaning public action motivated by anything other
than the common good. See, e.g., CORNELIUS TACITUS, ANNALiUM AB ExCESSU
DIVI AUGUSTI LIBRI, at I.27 "[l]amque non modo in commune sed in singulos
hommes latae quaestiones, et corruptissima re publica plunnmae leges." Id.
20 For the earliest English uses of "liberal" and "liberalism," and their
dependence on France, see 8 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 881-83 (2d ed.
1989). For the French Liberals, see Louis GIRARD, LES LiBARAUX FRANqAIs:
1814-1875 (1985).
21 BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 310-11 (Biancamana
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participation m government, while the liberty of the modems meant the
rule of law, and specific protections of the individual, including freedoms
of opinion, property, association, speech, and religion - not popular
sovereignty, but "peaceful enjoyment and private independence." '22 For
Constant, this "[ifndividual independence is the first need of the modems:
consequently one must never require from them any sacrifices to establish
political liberty "
Defining "liberalism" remains difficult, as with any partisan term,24
but Constant was not alone m considering individual freedom "the true
modem liberty "25 This attitude belongs more to England than to France,
and English authors soon embraced the French term to describe their own
tradition of limited government under the rule of law. John Stuart Mill
explicitly criticized European liberalism as too solicitous of the power of
the people,26 and set out to formulate a more specific test of the
propriety of government action.27 He concluded that "the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against Is will, is to prevent harm to others." '28
When scholars now speak of "liberal" legal principles they generally
think of this formula and the British tradition of individual rights behind
it," running back through John Trenehard and Thomas Gordon to
John Locke1 and Sir Edward Coke. 2 Mill distinguished this move-
ment towards "political liberties" or "rights" from the parallel and largely
unsuccessful pursuit of "constitutional checks" and popular sovereign-
Fontana ed. & trans., 1988) [hereinafter CONSTANT, POLmcAL WRITiNGS].
22 CONSTANT, POLMCAL WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 316.
2 Id. at 321.
24 For some attempts to put the term into bistoncal context, see, for
example, GuiDo DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LmERALIsM (R.G.
Collingwood trans., 5th ed. 1967); RicHARD BELLAMY, LIBERALISM AND
MODERN SocIETy: A HISTORICAL ARGUMENT (1992).
2s CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 323.
26 See generally John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL. ON
LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON SOcIALISM
(Stefan Collim ed., 1989).
27 See id. at 12.
28 Id. at 13.
29 See id. at 75.
30 See CATO'S LETRS, supra note 18.
3, See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOvERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed., 1988) (1690).
32 See generally SiR EDWARD COKE, INsTIrUTEs (London, 1628-1644).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ty 33 So British liberalism separated liberty from its political foundations.
Like Constant, Mill supposed that the content of liberty could be found
and protected without a balanced structure of republican government to
support it.
English proto-liberals under William HI or George I shared the
dilemma of the French liberals under Louis XVIII and Charles X. To
subjects of a restored monarchy after a failed revolution, the very word
"republic" breathed treason and the threat of anarchy Friends of liberty
hoped for legislative balance and a measure of mixed government under
their constitutional monarchy,34 but they had to support the King.3 So
American republicans found John Locke and others with this attitude a
good authority for "principles," but not for "forms" of government.3"
Locke recognized the King as "head of the Republick"37 and used the
English equivalent "commonwealth" only in the sense first "used by King
James the First."'38 This made him a good source during the early
"liberal" phase of the American revolution, when Americans were
disputing with Britain about rights, but not during the later "republican"
phase, when they came to design their constitutions.39 Liberals took their
organizing principle of liberty from the republican tradition, but demed
that it depended upon any particular form of government.4"
III. LIBERTY
The words liberty ("libertas") and republic ("res publica") grew up
together in the political vocabulary of the Roman state and its would-be
successors. Liberals separated the two by discarding the republican
commitment to popular sovereignty and balanced government. But pursuit
of the common good and the rule of law remained, at least initially, to
support the idea that governments should rule by consent. This meant that
liberalism and republicanism were not very different, at least at the
outset. John Locke defined the "Liberty of Man in Society" as subjection
3 Mill, supra note 26, at 6.
4 See Letter No. 61, in CATO's LETTERS, supra note 18, at 420-26.3
- See zd. at 13-15.
36 See Benjamin Rush, Observations on the Government of Pennsylvania, in
THE SELECTED WRiTINGs OF BENJAMiN RUSH 78 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947)
(1777).
3' LOCKE, supra note 31, at II.XVIII.205.
38 Id. at II.X. 133.
'9 See Letter, "Locke, Milton, Hume," ADAMs, supra note 1, at 1.365-371.
'o See LOCKE, supra note 31, at II.X. 132.
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to the duly enacted laws of a legislature established by consent, and
independent of any private will.41 The legislative power itself should be
"limited to the publick good" of society42 Benjamin Constant saw
"liberty" m England, France, and the United States of America as "the
right to be subjected only to the laws" and never to the "arbitrary will of
one or more individuals."'43
These definitions simply repeat the old republican conception of
liberty as service to the common good, under the rule of law. Republican
vocabulary had distinguished liberty from "license' (licentia), meaning
the unrestrained power to do what one wants.' Locke endorsed this
distinction,45 and castigated the monarchist theorist Sir Robert Filmer for
identifying "freedom" as the ability 'for every one to do what he lists, to
live as he pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws 1546 Locke's
liberty required having "a standing Rule to live by, common to every one
of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected in it. 197
This republican distinction between "liberty" and "license" becomes
hard to sustain without recourse to popular sovereignty and the proce-
dures of balanced government. The early liberal commitments to law and
the common good came into conflict once legislatures lost the legitimacy
of their republican foundations. If the public good sets the "utmost
[b]ounds" of the legislature's power,48 then laws that contravene the
public good are void. But liberals need a new techique to distinguish the
boundaries of valid legislation. This was the purpose of Mill's harm
principle, and remains the central dilemma of liberal theorists ever since.
What is liberty, if not the simple ability to do what one wants? But who
would be free with neighbors who could do whatever they wanted?
IV RIGHTS
The United States of America and its famous Bill of Rights49
inherited the British tradition of restricted government, which the Umon
41 Id. at I.IV.22.
42 Id. at I.XI.135.
43 CONSTANT, PoLrrIcAL WRiTINGS, supra note 21, at 310.
" See LivY, supra note 7, at 1H.9.5, 11.67.6.
41 See LOCKE, supra note 31, at 11.11.6.
41 Id. at II.IV.22.
47 d.
48 Id. at lI.XI.135.
49 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X (ratified Dec. 15, 1791).
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imposed on its component states after the American Civil War,"° and
onto the rest of the world through the United Nations after World War
II." French liberals had a similar list m their DMlaration des droits de
l'homme et du citoyen,"2 based on the Declaration of Rights of the
Commonwealth of Virgma. 3 These documents constitute the central
political accomplishments of the liberal legal tradition and supply a
provisional list of the fundamental requsites of liberty under liberal
conceptions of government.
Mill saw an implied conflict between rights and popularly elected
governments.54 Since "liberalism" (as such) originated m the failure of
the French revolution, there always has been a liberal tendency to contrast
rights with the political participation of the people.55 This is the basis on
which more recent scholars have opposed "liberal" to "republican"
institutions.56 Their views would have some basis if "republicansm"
simply meant "democracy" Maximng majority power implies
minimzing minority rights, and Mill was right to fear the "will" of the
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868).
51 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, adopted and proclaimed
by the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 10, 1948. Compare
INT'L COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS and INT'L
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, both of which appeared in an
annex to a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
December 16, 1966, and entered into force on January 3, 1976 (Economic) and
March 23, 1976 (Political). See G.A. Res. A/RES/2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 21st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 62.
52 DtCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN, first adopted
by the National Assembly on August 26, 1789.
53 THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (A Declaration ofRights Made
By the Representatives of the Good People of Virginia, Assembled in Full and
Free Convention; Which Rights Do Pertain to Them and Their Posterity, as the
Basis and Foundation of Government) (adopted unanimously by the Virgima
provincial congress on June 12, 1776). For the links between France and
Virginia, see R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO
WESTERN CoNsTITUTONAL LAW (1995).
" See Mill, supra note 26, at 7-8 ("The 'people' who exercise the power are
not always the same people with [sic] those over whom it is exercised; and the
'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of
each by all the rest.").
55 See generally CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 310-11
(comparing the new meaning of liberty "with that of the ancients").
56 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 2, at 63-73; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword,
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV L. REv 17-23 (1986-1987).
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nation. 7 But republicans equally condemn the tyranny of the majon-
ty 8 The purpose of popular sovereignty m republican governments is
not to subject individuals to the will of the nation, but to protect all
citizens from subjection to any person's will, by coordinating the whole
m pursuit of the common good. Republican procedures will discover
human rights, and republicans differ from liberals about rights only m
their stronger sense of where rights come from, and how to establish what
they are.5
9
Republican conceptions of liberty treat rights as a basis for human
well-being, existing to be discovered through public deliberation and
reflection about human nature, individual autonomy, and the proper
structure of government. The existence of the "respublica" implies a "res
pnvata," protected by the laws of the state.6" So Cicero thought that
without private goods, no public goods would survive,61 and John
Adams insisted that "respublica" signified "a government, m which the
property of the public, or people, and of every one of them, was secured
and protected by law." This idea "implies liberty" and that "the property
and liberty of all men, not merely of a majority, should be safe "162
Early English liberals made the same assertion without any authority
beyond tradition (Coke)63 or a mythical state of nature (Locke)' to
draw the line between citizens' rival liberties and establish the content of
their natural rights.65
" See Mill, supra note 26, at 8 ("The will of the people may desire to
oppress a part of their number. ").
58 See CICERO, supra note 9, at M.xxxiii.45.
5 See generally SusAN FORD WILTSHIRE, GREECE, ROME, AND THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1992) (discussing Greek and Roman antecedentsto the United States
Bill of Rights).
60 See CICERO, supra note 11, at I.vii.21, I.xvi.51.
61 See id. at I.v.21-24.
62 I ADAMs, supra note 1, at 160 ("[F]or the people, or public, compre-
hends more than a majority, it comprehends all and every individual; and the
property of every citizen is a part of the public property, as each citizen is a part
of the public, people, or community.").6 3 See STEPHEN D. WHrE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEvANCEs OF
THE COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628 ch. 7 (1979) (relating Coke's participation
in Parliament's discussion of the Petition of Right).
64 See LOCKE, supra note 31, at 11.11.6.
65 See id. at II.VII.87, II.XV.171. Locke found the Law of Nature "in the
minds of Men." Itd. at I.XI.136.
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V NEGATIVE LIBERTY
The history of liberalism until this century has been the European
history of privileges wrested from power, and the gradual compilation of
lists of violations that the state must never visit on its citizens. Law
feasted on the corpse of philosophy, and reformers fought for practical
guarantees in the absence of moral agreement. Moral pluralism yielded
these minimum protections in Europe, while moral unanimity produced
the same result in the United States.66 This gradually created a new and
narrower conception of liberty, as the area in which a person is "left to
do or be what he wants to do or be, without interference. 1967 Isaiah
Berlin called this "negative" freedom - the freedom simply to be left
alone .61 "Negative liberty" is greatest when people have the most
protection against coercion by the State or anyone else in society - the
most "rights" against interference by others.
This new sense of the word "liberty" followed naturally from
Constant's separation of law and politics. However, it offers no obvious
formula for what will count as "coercion," or who should be coerced
when one individual's desires conflict with another's. Berlin adapted his
vocabulary from Thomas Hobbes and other opponents of liberty, who
used "freedom" to describe what even John Locke would have recognized
as "license" and undesirable. 69 Hobbes often went much further,
defining "liberty" or "freedom" simply as "the absence of external
impediments of motion" applied to "inanimate creatures."7 So fear and
necessity are entirely compatible with Hobbes's sense of "corporal
liberty," which ended only with physical restraint, chains or imprison-
ment.71 Hobbes specifically reprobated the "specious name" of tradition-
66 Although there was never a "liberal movement" or "liberal party" in the
United States until after the Second World War, the protection of individual
rights provided a unifying ideology from the beginning. See Louis HARTZ, THE
LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA. AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 10- 11, 47 (1955).
67 ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE
7 (1958).
68 See id.
69 See LOCKE, supra note 31, at II.IV.22.
70 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 139 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Umv.
Press 1996) (1651).
71 See id. at 141.
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al liberty m his hostility to "popular states" or "Greek and Latin"
proposals to restrain and balance the monarch's absolute and sovereign
power.
72
Defining "liberty" as pure absence of restraint lowers its value
as a social ideal. Liberty stops being a status to be sought and be-
comes a retained privilege, perhaps too often granted or properly
withheld.73 Jeremy Bentham considered "liberty" to be opposed to
"government" '74 and hIs disciple John Austin confirmed that liberty is
"altogether incompatible with law, the very idea of which implies
restraint and obligation."'75 So negative "political or civil liberty is
the liberty from legal obligation, which is left or granted by a sover-
eign government to any of its own subjects." '76 One should not be
surprised at John Austin's scorn for "ignorant and bawling fanatics who
stun you with their pother about liberty, ' 7 since Austin considered
liberty "to be conceptually distinct from public welfare, and the
State. 78
Of course Berlin, Bentham, Hobbes and the rest may use words
however they like. Perhaps negative liberty follows naturally from liberal
theory, and liberty itself has limited value beyond some "mmnimum area
of personal freedom." '79 But few liberals have really thought so. Austin
proposed a form of "civil liberty" that would serve the government in its
'furtherance of the common weal.""0 Bentham proposed "utility" as the
measure of our negative freedom." Mill argued for hIs harm princi-
ple, 2 and even Berlin, who made Hobbesian views popular,' lacked
72 Id. at 143.
"3 See Mill, supra note 26, at 104 ("[O]wmg to the absence of any
recogmsed general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be
withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted.").
74 See JEREMY BENTHAM A FRAGMENT ON GovERNMENT 93 (J.H. Bumrns
& H.L.A. Hart eds., Cambridge Umv. Press, 1988) (1777).
75 JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 160
(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995) (1832).76 Id. at 223.
7 Id. at 224.
78 Id.
79 BERLIN, supra note 67, at 11.
80 AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 224.
81 BENTHAM, supra note 74, at 99.
82 See Mill, supra note 26, at 13 ("[T]he only purpose for which power can
be nightfifly exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
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Hobbes's fortitude, suggesting that liberty depends on how many
possibilities are open, how easy they are to achieve, how important and
how widely shared they are, and so forth. 3
VI. PosTVE LiBERTY
Berlin distinguished ns preferred "negative" liberty from "positive"
liberty The distinction iq instructive, though not exactly m the sense that
Berlin used it. If "negative liberty" means not being interfered with m
doing what one wants, "7'positive liberty" should mean being able to do
what one wants, or being made able to do so. Negative liberty is
"freedom from" constraint. Positive liberty is "freedom to" realize one's
goals.84 In saying that the extent of my negative freedom depends in
part on "how many possibilities are open to me,"85 Berlin obscured the
difference by attaching the benefits of positive liberty to his negative
ideal. But Berlin fear-d constraint more than he valued opportuity
Perhaps in restraimg human passions the state might maintain a new
orthodoxy, and through the "specious disguise" of liberation impose its
own "brutal tyranny "
86
Positive liberty is negative liberty writ large, and neither is liberty at
all, m the original republican sense of the word. "Negative" liberty is
license to avoid restraint. "Positive" liberty is license and ability to fulfill
one's desires. Berlin suggested that human desire may often run to
imposing some collective will on recalcitrant individuals.87 However, m
the absence of constraint, negative liberty might have similar results.88
will, is to prevent harm to others.").
83 See BERLIN, supra note 67, at 15 n. 1.
84 See id. at 16.
85 Id. at 15 n. 1. The extent of freedom also depends on
(b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize; (c)
how important m my plan of life, given my character and circumstanc-
es, these possibilities are when compared with each other; (d) how far
they are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; [and] (e) what
value not merely the agent, by the general sentiment of the society in
which he lives, puts on the various possibilities.
86 Id. at 16.
87 See id. at 17
88 Berlin admits as much. See id. at 19 (stating that "as in the case of the
'positively' free self, [the 'negatively' free self] may be inflated into some
super-personal entity - a state, a class, a nation, or the march of history itself,
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Reducing liberty to the positive or negative ability to do what one wants
does not resolve what to do when people's wants conflict. Berlin
criticizes Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, and Kant for believing the
subject of a commonwealth free, "because the common interests must
include his own."" Instead, he insists, m agreement with Bentham, that
"liberty to do evil" is liberty too and deserves public protection. "'Every
law is an infraction of liberty ""
Berlin's sense of "positive" liberty borrows something from
Constant's "liberty of the ancients," in that it concerns who is to
determine the limits of the law,91 and nplies democratic rule.92 Using
a public-regarding procedure to limit private initiatives violates Berlin's
negative conception of liberty because it implies controlling what people
may do, for their own good,9' and so violates Mill's dictum that "'t]he
only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good
in our own way v 94
When everyone pursues his or her own good in Ins or her own way
there will be collisions that need to be resolved. Berlin criticizes the
conception that a free state should be governed by laws that rational
persons would accept. 95 In other words, he rejects Cicero's republican
aim of constructing institutions that will harmoize citizens' interests m
order to give everyone a worthwhile life.96 But it is hard to see where
else to draw the boundary between citizens' desires. As Berlin noted,
Spinoza has suggested that "'[tihe subject of a true commonwealth is no
slave, because the common interests must include his own."' 97 This is
not the sentiment of a "Jacobin" or a "commiumst," as Berlin would have
it, but the common sense observation that we all have an interest in
regarded as a more 'real' subject of attributes than the empmcal self.").
19 Id. at 32.90 Id. at 33 (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
91 See zd. at 7 (asserting that positive liberty "is involved in the answer to
the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference, that can
determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?"').
92 See id. at 14.
93 Id. at 1794 Id. at 11 (quoting Mill).
11 See id. at 30.
96 See CICERO, supra note 11, at mH.vi.26 ("Ergo unum debet esse omnibus
propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas umus cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se
quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omms humana consortio.").
97 BERLIN, supra note 67, at 32 (quoting Spinoza).
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protections against each other, through which no individual citizens will
be preferred above the rest.
Setting out to harmonize private interests for the public good does not
imply that there is "only one correct way of life.""8 It is an unavoidable
task. "Negative liberty" leads to conflicts between private interests.
'Tositive liberty" does too. Yet decisions must be made. A responsible
theory of liberty will explain how to make them. One solution might be
a despotism of the best and wisest, as in Mozart's Temple of Sarastro in
The Magic Flute.99 But the "best and wisesg' have interests of their
own. °° The republican formula has been to seek systems of popular
sovereignty that will harness the reason of all citizens in search of a just
result.
"The fathers of liberalism," Mill and Constant, sought the greatest
amount of government non-interference that would be consistent with the
basic requirements of social life.'0 But even Mill's notion of a liberty
limited only by the danger of doing harm to others requires a definition
of harm. The French revolution illustrates the dangers of unfettered
majorities, but its worst excesses bypassed the sovereign people.' 2
Isaiah Berlin himself concedes that political "positive" rights may protect
the liberals' "ultimate value" of "individual - 'negative' - liberty "103
The liberal fear of democracy derives in large part from a belief that
"human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual
rivalry with one another.""' This may be true, but it should not rule
out the search for synthesis. The ideal of freedom to live as one wishes,
and the pluralism of values connected with it, need not lead to the war
of all against all. "Liberty" to be oppressed by one's neighbor is no
liberty at all. Hobbes cheapened the language when he redefined 'liberty"
as unfettered action: Liberals make a profound mistake when they adopt
ins vocabulary
98 Id. at 36. "In this way the rationalist argument, with its assumption of the
single true solution, has led from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility
and individual self-perfection, to an authoritarian state obedient to the directives
of an 61ite of Platomc guardians." Id. at 37
9 See zd. at 39.
'00 Cf. Madison, supra note 16.
0 This is the view, at least of Isaiah Berlin. BERLIN, supra note 67, at 46.
102 For Berlin's strictures on government by the people, quoting Mill and
Constant, see id. at 48.
103 Id. at 50.
'04 Id. at 56.
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VII. NATURAL LAW
Law supplies the traditional boundary between liberty and license.
ThIs was the view of Cicero,105 Livy,'0 6 Harrmgton,'07 Sidney,
0 8
Montesquieu,'0 9 and Adams. " Even John Locke fully accepted that.
there can be no liberty without law,"' properly understood not as
limitation, but as "the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his
proper Interest," which "prescribes no farther than is for the general Good
of those under that Law "'12
This sanguine conception of law preceded the sullen positivism of
Hobbes and John Austin, and accompames the Stoic tradition of natural
law that inspired the natural rights theories of modem Europe and
America."' It assumes law to be "right reason, commanding
honesty, and forbidding inquity, [and] founded in eternal mor-
als. ,14 "Law," in this sense, must be the product of reason, which
governments serve through the establishment and implementation of just
and equal laws. 'The great question is, [w]hat combination of powers
in society, or what form of government, will compel the formation of
good and equal laws, an impartial execution, and faithful interpretation
of them, so that the citizens may constantly enjoy the benefit of them,
and be sure of their continuance."'
15
Liberals distinguished themselves from republicans by refusing to
answer this question. Their claim of natural rights against kings and
governments requires the existence of truth about justice and human
nature. But the liberal techmque of accommodation with power limited
o See CICERO, PRO CLUENTIO.
106 See LIVY, supra note 7, at 2.1.
107 See JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A
SYSTEM OF POLmrIcS 19-20 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992) (1656).
108 See SIDNEY, supra note 8.
109 See MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRr DES Lois, pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 3 (Geneva,
1748).
11 See 1H ADAMS, supra note 1, at 159-60.
" See LOCKE, supra note 31, at II.VI.57
112 Id.
13 See generally WILTSHIRE, supra note 59; BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT,
JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw" A STUDY -IN THE HISTORY
OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (1931).
114 I ADAMS, supra note 1, at 282 (quoting CICERO, II In Anton. 28);
CICERO, supra note 12, at 1.11, id. at 111.2.
"1 1I ADAMS, supra note 1, at 128.
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liberals' ability to question arbitrary decisions. Their triumphs in England
relied on the natural "reason" of judge-made law, and recent history in
the United States repeats this pattern.
VII. PosItE LAW
Prominent liberal lawyers once munmized the connection between
law and justice or morality, including law's role as the arbiter between
liberty and license. Their commitment to the rule of law as a fence
against oppression led some liberals to deny the incorporation of moral
standards into law, fearing ambiguity and unwanted administrative
discretion.116 The utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Austin sought
to establish a sharp distinction between law "as it is" and law "as it ought
to be,"' 17 notwithstanding the traditional view of law (found in Black-
stone) that human enactments contrary to justice are void and not law at
all.118
Self-identified liberals such as H.L.A. Hart accepted (as they had to)
that courts may be asked to incorporate morality into their decisions, but
still praised "positivism" as having "'delivered law from the dead
body of morality """9 Although liberals such as Hart admitted that
laws confer rights, they also claimed that rules can confer rights without
being moral. 20 These arguments aimed at separating moral or natural
rights from law, viewing bad decisions by judges about rights as bad law,
but law nonetheless.' Social policies may influence judges, but are not
themselves "law" to positivists, who suppose that maintaining this
distinction makes law easier to criticize and reform."
Restricting the conception of what constitutes a "legal rule!' so as to
exclude "policy" or 'morality" protects the determmacy of law and a core
of settled meaning through which rules can control the judiciary."
Liberal positivism developed to protect the rule of law against judicial
116 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation ofLaw and Morals,
in EssAYs iN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOsoPHY 49-87 (1983).
117 For a discussion of the antecedents of this viewpoint, see id. at 50.
118 See id. at 52.
1'9 Id. at 55 (quoting AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 4 (5th ed. 1881) (who
attributed tis statement to Ins predecessor, Austin)).
10 See HART, supra note 116, at 62.
121 See id. at 68.
,22 See id. at 69.
'2' See id. at 71.
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usurpation and maintain the conviction that rules have authority 24 As
positivists understand it, the spiritual message of liberalism lies in
opposing bad laws openly, not in making bad laws good through judicial
chicanery 12 Direct appeals or references to morality by judges assume
a greater union of social alms and judgment than liberals either expect or
endorse.2 6 This does not mean that they deny the existence of moral
truths, but rather that these truths should be used to judge the law In
positivist theory such truths are never part of the law itself."7
Legal positivism represents a seriously altered liberalism in its effort
to curb judicial activism. English liberalism began as a battle by English
judges to enforce natural justice against the kings. Judicially-mterpreted
bills of rights constitute the liberals' first great triumph and most lasting
legacy Positivism arose when liberals began to question the authority of
judges, as they had questioned kings and parliaments before. Where
judges once had "found" the law, now liberals wished them to follow it,
wnch meant that legal decisions must be determinable by reference to
facts alone, facts concerning the intentions of authorities who promulgat-
ed the laws involved.'
Ths approach raised new problems for liberal theory While early
liberals placed their faith in judges, nghts, and the rule of law, positivist
liberals with their "sources thesis" squarely face questions of legitimacy
and the basis of legislative authority 129 So long as "law" meant "right
reason," liberals could endorse the rule of law without further explanation
and avoid questions of political legitimacy But as soon as law comes to
be seen as obedience to some particular person's authority, that authority
needs justification. The rule of law ceases to be a universal moral
imperative and applies only to certain societies, meeting certain determ-
nate criteria. This leaves liberals unable to escape the issues their
progenitors first disavowed republicanism to avoid, and particularly the
question, which system of legislation will most likely get law right. 130
124 See id. at 72.
121 See id. at 75.
126 See id. at 80.
127 See Id. at 82.
12' See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICs IN THE PUBLIC
DoMAIN: EssAYs IN THE MORALrrY OF LAW AND PoLITIcs 194-221 (1994)
[heremafter ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN].
129 See Id. at 200.
0 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Politics of the Rule of Law, in ETHICS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 128, at 354-62.
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Once liberals set out to construct their own theory of political
authority, questions of truth and soundness emerge that contemporary
liberals usually hope to avoid.' For example, democracy, long taken
for granted by many liberal theorists as desirable, must be justified in
terms of its instrumental value m realizing good government."' Liberals
need a political theory of their own. If law has no inherent moral value,
and yet judges must obey the law, there must be some authority behind
the law to make its directives binding.
IX. POLmCAL LIBERALISM
Republicamsm and liberalism first diverged when some "liberals"
(formerly republicans) accepted the shackles of autocratic power.
Liberalism asserted the value of being left alone, even at the price of
accepting an "enlightened" despot. Tins liberal policy of avoiding conflict
seemed very appealing m an era when public controversies cost many
subjects their lives. Liberalism began as a retreat into the private sphere
and developed as the private sphere expanded, incorporating more and
more formerly public functions. So, liberalism started as a flight from
politics, embracing a new defimtion of liberty as the ability to do what
one wants, m one's own way But tis defintion has political implica-
tions, and gradually a new political science of liberalism emerged,
reflecting liberalism's new conception of "liberty"
To claim rights against authority implies that rights somehow exist
independently of the powers that promulgate or enforce them. It implies
truth about justice. Liberals cannot support skeptical or relativist views
without undermining the foundations of their own philosophy Yet, at the
same time, they seek maximum private autonomy in all areas, including
the autonomy to make mistakes without shame or criticism. This often
means avoiding questions of truth, which imply the possibility of error
and the burden of disapproval. Political liberalism faces its greatest
difficulty m maintaining the value of autonomy while avoiding the
implicit demgration of private views that are wrong.
John Rawls developed the best known and most compelling recent
argument for a liberal theory of politics. 3 His first solution to the
131 See Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Scepticism, and Democracy, in ETHIcs IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 128, at 101.
132 See id. at 102.
133 See generally JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTCE (1971) [hereinafter
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]; JoHN RAwLs, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM (1993)
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liberal difficulty about truth was to assert the primacy of the "right" over
the "good," where the right concerns basic rules of public interaction, and
the good concerns private judgments about one's own life. Agreement
about the right avoids controversies about the good.134 But people
disagree about public rules of justice, divided by their differing religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines. Rawls accepts most such disagreement
as "reasonable" and seeks to construct a similarly "reasonable" form of
politics that reaches consensus by avoiding controversy 135
This liberal commitment to avoiding conflict distinguishes political
liberalism from its republican antecedents in two Important ways, both of
which are rooted in the new liberal conception of liberty as the ability to
do what one wants. First, contemporary liberals assume the inevitable
pluralism of religious, philosophical, and moral ideas. 136 Second, they
eschew all arguments about the validity of these doctrines, preferring to
act only in areas where all can agree. Liberal politics does not seek the
general good, but rather a scheme of public cooperation that respects each
individual's antecedent moral and philosophical affiliations. 37
Political liberalism views politics as the vehicle through which
individuals propose and accept fair terms of cooperation' to advance
their own ends, including their private conceptions of the public
good.'39 Liberal politics is not epistemological or in any way concerned
with truth. 140 Centuries of conflict about religious, philosophical, and
moral beliefs have created a liberal sensibility that assumes the practical
impossibility of reaching reasonable and workable political agreement
about truth.41 Liberals now separate reason from the truth, taking
"reasonable" to refer to a willingness to get along,142 and supposing that
references to "truth" may preclude agreement.'43
Liberal publicists sometimes seem simply to avoid the forbidden
word, while acting in every other respect as if certain propositions were
[hereinafter RAwLs, PoLrICAL LiBERALISM].
134 See RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 133, at 446-52.
,35 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 133.
36 See, e.g., id. at 36-37
137 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 133, at 303.
138 See id. at 53.
131 See, e.g,, id. at 36-37
'" See id. at 62.
141 See id. at 63.
142 See id. at 64.
"s See id. at 94.
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"true 144 or "probably true, 145 but the fundamentally liberal view-
point goes further, recogmzmg a wide range of views as reasonable, even
when mistaken.1 46 Holding a political conception as true is exclusive,
even sectarian, to the committed liberal and likely to foster political
division.147
The liberal return to politics reveals how liberal conceptions of
human nature have diverged from their republican (and early liberal)
antecedents. Republicans view all humans as possessing reason and a
certain degree of humility, capable of being swayed by argument and
deferring to reasonable deliberation, even when not fully convinced.
14 1
Early liberals, such as John Stuart Mill, agreed but feared this natural
tendency towards consensus as leading to error and oppression. 1 49
Contemporary liberals, mostly in the United States, have developed a new
view of citizens as inevitably and irredeemably divided by conflicting and
incommensurable opinions about truth and morality 50
Liberals consider the psychic pain of being wrong too great to allow
politics to prefer true doctrines over others which are widely
believed.151 The liberal search for political consensus depends on
avoiding controversy, while republicans embrace it. A reasonable liberal
respects wrong views. A reasonable republican is open to persuasion that
his or her own views may themselves be wrong. Liberals want to apply
their principle of uncritical acceptance to philosophy itself.'52 Republi-
cans tolerate wrong views, but encourage the search for truth when truth
affects the common welfare of society
The liberal conception of persons as self-directed individuals requires
a new conception of political society, which forbids the creation of
community through politics. 153 Since political liberalism avoids divisive
issues, which may threaten social* harmony,5 political liberals must
144 Id.
141 Id. at 113.
146 See id. at 127
147 See id. at 129.
148 See Mortimer Sellers, Republican Impartiality, 11 OxFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 273 (1991).
149 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 26, at 8-9.
150 See, e.g., RAwLs, POLIcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 133, at 133.
'51 See id. at 138.
152 See d. at 152.
1 See, e.g., id. at 146 n.13.
154 See id. at 157
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keep the scope of political discussion as narrow as possible..55 "Com-
mon ground," therefore, replaces the common good as a basis of social
cooperation.1
56
Tis is not to say that political liberalism rejects the ideal of social
cooperation. On the contrary, it is only in seeking a basis for such
cooperation that liberalism becomes "political" in the first place.'57
Contemporary liberalism has also largely abandoned the fear of democra-
cy that separated liberalism from republicanism in the early nineteenth
century, and liberals now usually encourage the widespread political
participation of a vigorous and informed citizen body 58 But liberals
reject the idea that social cooperation and common projects provide any
essential element in human well-being,5 9 or that citizens can find
agreement about issues of fundamental unportance.
X. PUBLIC REASON
The liberal return to politics revives the area of public reason that
characterized republican legal discourse. Republican statecraft made truth
about justice and common good the measure of legal validity, as verified
through balanced mechanisms of popular sovereignty and public debate.
Contemporary liberals now generally accept democracy without argument,
and with it the concept of public reason, advanced in pursuit of the public
good. '6 But liberals still tend to limit the arena in which public reasons
may be advanced, restricting their province to the "constitutional
essentials of society "'6
Political liberals limit acceptable public debate to a very narrow range
of public reasons, excluding appeals to controversial truths that not all
citizens yet accept."' Liberals argue that philosophical and moral
diversity are permanent features of public culture that foreclose the
exercise of political power unless all citizens may reasonably be expected
to endorse the proposed intervention in the light of their own constitution-
al beliefs and ideals. This liberal principle of political legitimacy 63
115 See id. at 180.
156 See id. at 194.
157 See id. at 201.
'5s See id. at 205.
'5 See id. at 206.
160 See id. at 213.
161 Id. at 214.
162 See Id. at 216.
163 See id. at 217
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requires citizens to govern themselves in ways that each fhinks the others
might reasonably be expected to accept.'" It repeats the old republican
formula, modified only by the liberals' new sense of "reasonable' debate.
Liberals would forbid appeals to the whole truth of a question, even when
it might be readily available.1
65
This more sophisticated liberal view rejects the questionable doctrine
that people should simply vote their private preferences and interests. But
it also rejects the republican commitment to voting what is right and true
or just and good. Instead, liberals would restrict public reason to those
constitutional essentials that others would "reasonably" accept.1 66
Rawls's famous liberal theory of justice suggests that such essentials will
best be found by imagining oneself in an "original position," 67 where
no one knows which philosophy or position in society each will hold in
the real world.'68
American liberals often take the Supreme Court of the United States
as their central exemplar of public reason in a democracy 1 69 If the
United States Constitution is "a principled expression in higher law of the
political ideal of a people to govern itself in a certain way,"'.7 ° then the
Supreme Court must take responsibility for making the Constitution just.
Liberals ascertain the idea of right and just constitutions and basic laws
by looking directly to the most reasonable political conception of justice
and not to the result of any actual political process. 7' By applying its
own public reason, the Court prevents private factions in the legislature
from running the government in their own self-interest.'72 Once again,
liberalism must return to the republican criteria that stand behind it to
determine what the Constitution means and how it should be interpreted.
XI. THE REPUBLICAN REVIVAL
The crucial assumption of liberalism, as understood by its modem
defenders, is that citizens will never relinquish their different and
1' See id. at 218.
165 See id.
166 See id. at 219.
167 Id. at 227
168 See id. at 222-28.
169 See id. at 230.
170 Id. at 232.
171 See id. at 233.
172 See id.
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permanently incommensurable conceptions of the good. 1 3 This demgra-
tion of reasoned argument as a source of consensusT has led a self-
styled "republican revival" to reassert the value of reason in politics.'7 5
According to this argument, many clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion exist largely to prevent private interests from exercising undue
influence on public policy 176 The United States Constitution's republi-
can roots seem to offer a basis for transcending society's diversity in
pursuit of the common good, developed through a public process of
collective self-determination.'77
This conception of republican impartiality among contemporary
lawyers rests largely on the writings of J.G.A. Pocock and Gordon
Wood. 7 It reflects an ethos of "civic virtue" among certain recent
critics of pluralism that stands beside the republican tradition, though
somewhat outside it.'79 Proponents of constitutional "civi" republican-
ism" criticize liberal pluralism as inviting interest-group politics and the
exercise of raw political power.' To treat the political process as just
another form of market offends neo-republican legal scholars, who invite
courts to prevent "naked preferences" from capturing the political
process."1
Cass Sunstem and Frank Michelman played a large role in bringing
the word "republican" back into American constitutional discourse. Both
saw republicanism as a vehicle for supportingjudicial intervention against
flawed political or legislative decision-making. Sunstem encouraged
courts to disallow legislation that does not serve public values.'82
Judges should "ensure that government decisions are the product not of
. See id. at 303.
7 See zd. at 338-39.
'"For a discussion and bibliography on the republican revival, see G.
Edward White, Reflections on the "Republican Revival" Interdisciplinary
Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1-35. (1994).
176 See Cass R. Sunstein, NakedPreferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REv 1689, 1689-1732 (1984).
"' See id. at 1691.
178 See, e.g., id. at 1691 nn.12-13.
179 See e.g., JORGEN HABERMAs, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, A= VRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); ROBERTo
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrICS (1975) (all cited by Sunstem,
supra note 176, at n.27).
180 See Sunstem, supra note 176, at 1692.
181 See id. at 1693.
182 See id. at 1695-96.
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preexisting private interests but of broad and open-ended public delibera-
tion." '183 Michelman suggests that the United States Supreme Court
should constitute its own (as he terms it) '"pazdeia," deciding cases in
support of the common cultural inheritance,'"4 rather than positi've law
or precedent. 8 Such decisions are "republican" m Michelman's view,
to the extent that they concern themselves with "civic virtue and general
good." 18
6
Proponents of the republican revival present their republican
vocabulary as a "deviatiomst doctrine" that provides a "counter-ideolo-
gy" 87 to traditional liberal constitutional ideas."88 This is true to the
extent that a republican commitment to the common good contradicts
modem liberalism's new conception of liberty as freedom to do what one
wants. But neo-republican reliance on the judiciary closely murrors liberal
tradition. Even the republican challenge to interest-group pluralism.8 9
sunply repeats liberalism's onginal reaction against democratictyranny
Traditional republicamsm supposed that carefully structured public
deliberation would reveal (or at least come closer than any other process
to revealing) the truth about issues of public importance."' Out of
deference to modem individualist sensibilities, contemporary republicans
have sought to retain republican procedures of normative justification,
while shedding their objectivist foundations.' 9 For example, Frank
Michelman concedes- the republican premise of popular sovereignty or
"self-government"' 92 and embraces the possibility of reaching agree-
ment through dialogue or "discourse," 93 but presents these both as
"associational" and socially contingent techmques.'94 He displaces
183 Id. at 1731.
184 Michelman, supra note 56, at 13 n.44.
.ss See id. at 16-17
'86 Id. at 18 (defining civic virtue as "'the willingness of citizens to
subordinate their private interests to the general good"') (quoting GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTmUONAL LAW (1986)).
187 Id. at 17-18.
"8 See also STONE ET AL., supra note 186, at 5.
189 See Michelman, supra note 56, at 21.
190 Cf. Cass Sunstem, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REv 29, 32-33 (1985).
191 See Michelman, supra note 56, at 23.
192 Id. at 27
193 Id. at 31.
,94 See id. at 38.
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republican deliberation from the people to the courts, where face-to-face
deliberation more easily takes place.
Legal rights, above or beyond politics, do not give neo-republicans
much trouble. 9 Of course they endorse law and rights as unavoidably
part of contemporary American legal discourse, but these "objectivist
moments" reflect a deeper, "inclusive" dialogue of social reconcilia-
tion. 96 So, neo-republicans follow a "deep tradition" or "first principle"
of "positive freedom," realized as "self-government" through politics.'97
This need not be real self-government or real politics, which may be
subject to self-interest, but rather, as Michelman suggests, the "virtual
representation'"98 of virtuous judges deliberating on behalf of the
people, because the people cannot deliberate themselves.'99
The new republicans depart from tradition in their tendency to treat
"self-government" as an end in itself,"0 embracing the conception of
freedom criticized by Constant as the liberty "of the ancients."' This
need not mean voting, however, as in the Greek democracies, but rather
"dialogue," as practiced by judges and "the reasoning class." '  Neo-
republicans see liberty as "socially situated self-direction."0 3 This is
neither liberal nor republican, in the traditional sense, but represents a
new conception of "liberty" as social solidarity According to this theory,
Supreme Court justices owe deference to no other authority beyond
themselves, but they owe each other a duty of dialogue on behalf of the
people.204
Neo-republican theories constitute less of a challenge than a
supplement to modem liberal constitutionalism."' What contemporary
republicans challenge is the "pluralist" tendency of some liberals to deny
the possibility of moral persuasion.0 6 Where political liberalism rested
"I See zd. at 42.
196 Id. at 42-43.
197 Id. at 47
1"8 Id. at 51.
19 See id. at 64, 73.
200 See, e.g., zd. at 73.
201 CONSTANT, POLITCAL WRITINGS, supra note 21, at 311.
202 Michelman, supra note 56, at 73-74.
203 Id. at 75 (defining "socially situated self-direction. [as] self-direction
by norms cognizant of fellowship with equally self-directing others").
204 See 1d. at 76-77
205 See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988).
206 See id. at 1507
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on the perception that people will never agree about fundamental public
issues, "republican" liberals hope to take all perspectives into account m
constructing social consensus.207 Recognizing an "indissoluble plurality
of perspectives," republicans still hope to construct a common good
through which citizens may maintain their equality 208
Cass Sunstem, one of the first theorists of this quasi-"republican"
revival, quickly embraced "liberal republicansm" as his chosen program
for the future.20 9 This represents the natural culmination of modem
liberalism's turn to democratic politics. Sunstem presents his republican
principles as important liberal methods of controlling and limiting
governmental power,210 explaining most rights as either the precondi-
tions or the outcome of an undistorted deliberative process.2 '
Sunstem's "liberal republicamsm" understands the private sphere as
constituted by public decisions, but treats this unsurpnsmg insight as a
reason for the preservation, not obliteration, of liberal constraints on
government.212
"Liberal republicans" retain the old republican conviction that
sometimes choices must be made between competing conceptions of the
good life.2 3 Republicans recognize that some perspectives are better
than others.21 4 So, in the end, must liberals, if they are to establish
universal rights and standards for preventing harm to others. The
republican revival first developed in American law schools to provide a
rationale for judicial activism after President Reagan's reelection m 1984.
But the fundamental republican insight that neo-republicans embraced
remains convincing and effective: that people can agree about law and
justice if they set out to deliberate in a spirit of humility and shared
commitment to the common good.
XII. REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM, AND THE LAW
Republicans and liberals both seek liberty through the protection of
the law Republican laws arise in turn through service to the common
207 See id. at 1511.
208 Id. at 1526.
209 Cass R. Sunstem, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1541 (1988).
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good, discovered by popular sovereignty under a mixed and balanced
constitution. Liberals first differed from republicans m their disregard for
the sources of law, so long as citizens were left alone. This led eventually
to new conceptions of liberty, first as freedom from government, then as
the ability to do what one wants.
Repeating this brief history reveals the reason why republicans and
liberals diverged, but also why they have come together again towards the
end of the twentieth century The ability to do what one wants needs
some restriction. Those who follow Hobbes in seeing liberty as the
complete absence of restraint still need to explain when unfettered
"liberty" should exist and when it should be suppressed. My "liberty" (in
this sense) to hurt you infringes your liberty not to be hurt. Liberals must
offer rules for when Hobbesian "liberty" should be respected and when
it should not.
In the era of kings and despots, liberals avoided the name "republi-
can" and the cry of popular sovereignty for fear of the consequences.
Liberals feared public power and the majority's ability to dispossess and
degrade their neighbors, as happened during the French and English
revolutions. So early liberals embraced law as the proper line between
liberty and license, and took judges or the common law tradition as the
best source of authority, rather than any public deliberative process.
The liberal technique of avoiding controversial issues grew out of the
wars of religion in Europe. Proponents of freedom in politics found it
easier to advance their position when they exhibited flexibility about
religion. Similarly, advocates of religious and other freedoms found their
lives easier when they took no position on politics. Religious affiliations
developed an ethnic or tribal significance and many people found it easier
to be reasonable in practice when they overlooked or set aside religion.
Religious doctrines often stood as totems, symbolic of affiliation, but not
of real belief. When tis was true, toleration became easier, and religion
lost its political significance.
This is the model liberals apply when they speak of "different and
irreconcilable conceptions of the good."2 5 The unplication is that
people, left to think freely, will develop opinions that they will absolutely
refuse to discuss, and which can only be modified "by the autocratic use
of state power. 21 6 Such opinions do exist, but they usually reflect the
traditions in which we are raised.217 Liberals promote toleration and
215 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 133, at 303.
216 Id. at 304.
217 Rawls admits as much. See id. at 314.
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accommodation of "reasonable" differences. However, most intractable
differences are not "reasonable," which is precisely what makes them so
difficult to reconcile.
To the extent that republicans and liberals necessarily disagree, it is
over this point of human nature. How can people create a worthwhile
society in the face of natural self-interest, faction, misperception,
stubbornness, and ignorance? Early liberals wanted everyone free as much
as possible to pursue private projects. Later liberals wanted everyone
supported as much as possible to realize private projects. Recent liberals
even admit the value of certain public projects. But all liberals have
sought to avoid the public search for truth about contentious issues.
Liberals think that people will cooperate best by avoiding issues of
substance. Republicans think that people will cooperate best when called
upon to act together, in pursuit of the common good.
This difference between republicans and liberals appears clearly from
the standpoint of Rawls's "original position!' in which no one knows his
or her position in society or moral and philosophical beliefs." 8 Liberals
suppose that in such a position people would choose a conception of
justice that respects everyone's beliefs equally, however erroneous. 19
Republicans suggest that not knowing which beliefs each would hold,
people in the original position would prefer that correct or useful beliefs
should prevail, and would select a system of justice that favors truth over
falsehood, by promoting rational deliberation.
The problem, of course, with saying that truth should prevail is that
misinformed or self-interested leaders: have often inposed error and
oppression under the banner of truth and justice. This is why republican
doctrine has always specified the political structures most likely to serve
justice and the common good. There can be no republic under a lng or
without balanced government and a democratic branch in the constitution.
Early liberals who jettisoned the republican form of government were left
to make unsupported assertions about rights, which unchecked powers
sometimes endorsed (perhaps in the face of revolution) but never
respected.
The liberals' proposal of maximum autonomy, limited only by harm
to others, quickly faced two major difficulties: first, the question of what
constitutes a "harm," and second, the problem of the common or public
good. Under a liberal theory, "harm" defines the limits of autonomy and
the proper province of law and politics. Are harms to the common good
218 See id. at 22-28.
219 See id. at 310-11.
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cognizable as harms under a liberal theory of justice? If they are, then
liberalism simply repeats the republican formula without the support of
a republican form of government. This seems to have been the position
of early liberals such as Locke in England and Constant in France. If not,
then one very important aspect of human well-being has been overlooked,
vitiating the entire theory
John Stuart Mill and his followers took a somewhat different position,
fearing social solidarity as a source of oppression. Unlike many modem
liberals, these Englishmen (rightly) viewed stable free societies as
naturally tending towards consensus. The difficulty for government in
such situations is to nurture and protect private expressions of autonomy
against overwhelming public opimon. Stable societies develop practices
and traditions that outlive their usefulness. Mill thought that dissent
should be encouraged in order to prevent distorting monopolies in the
marketplace of ideas.
Mill's conception of the marketplace of ideas reintroduced the social
element that was central to the older republican tradition. Ideas are found,
developed and refined through social interaction. This forces liberals to
develop theories of public deliberation. What structures of law and
society will supply individuals with the largest or best supply of ideas?
If liberal liberty means in part "the right to be subjected only to laws,"
wich laws will best support individual autonomy and useful public
debate? Liberals need a theory of legislation to support the various laws
and rights they have freely (and variously) proposed and supported.
For liberals, as for republicans, laws should draw the line beyond
which public officials must leave private autonomy intact. Finding and
applying such laws equally to all citizens, irrespective of prominence or
position, constitutes the central responsibility of the state. Recently some
liberals have adopted Sir Robert Filmer's conception of liberty as the
ability "to do what [one] lists,"'2 ° but these new semantics do not
obviate the need to draw the boundaries of this individual "liberty" or
private "license" (to use John Locke's vocabulary). Positive bills of rights
detail protections against the state, but not usually for citizens against
each other. In any case, proposed lists need some basis of authority
Whose list should apply9
Verifying rights had little importance in an era when all rights
depended on benevolent despots. One accepted the rights that were
granted and sought to hold monarchs to their word. This tactical
220 LOCKE, supra note 31, at ll.1V.22.
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arrangement gave way as other possible sources of law emerged to
challenge hereditary sovereignty The better the legislator, the better the
rule of law Locke and others proposed "consent" as the measure of legal
validity But whose consent and for what purpose? Liberalism always
feared the tyranny of the majority as much and perhaps more than the
tyranny of kngs. So as autocrats weakened, liberals turned back to the
political issues their doctrine first emerged to avoid, and above all the
question of legitimate authority and the proper sources of law
Republicanism is the parent of liberalism in two senses: first, because
liberalism grew out of republicamsm when republicans lost their political
will after the French revolution; second, because only republicanism can
justify specific liberal rights and the boundaries drawn by law Positive
law needs a source of moral authority, which republicans supply in their
commitment to the common good, and a technique of legislation, which
republicans offer in their mixed and balanced democracy The incomplete
and half-understood "republican revival" in American law schools reflects
contemporary liberals' dissatisfaction with the absence of moral founda-
tions and sense of common purpose m contemporary judicial decision-
making. Liberals need theories of justice and politics to support their
commitment to law
Perhaps there is still some room for a distinction between liberals and
republicans in contemporary legal theory, or at least for a group of
"liberal republicans" within the wider republican consensus. If there is
any difference, it amounts to this: liberal republicans seek to make
political and legal decisions in ways that avoid overruling any individu-
al's private conception of the public good. Liberal republicans would
keep the scope of public deliberation as narrow as possible, to avoid
conflicts with factional beliefs or affiliations, while traditional republicans
promote common interests, in which every citizen can have a part.
Republicanism, liberalism, and the rule of law share a long and
tangled common history For many years liberalism was simply republi-
camsm that dared not speak its name, until in the end the name was
forgotten, and with it the meaning of the "republican" guarantees m the
United States Constitution. Now once again, as liberalism overcomes the
constraints that first brought it forth, issues of democracy, rights, and
justice are addressed together, and many old solutions emerge, already
embedded in the constitutional structures of Western democracy. To seek
or speak of liberty without the common good is arrant nonsense. Liberals
who once made this mistake have become republicans again, without
realizing it. There can be no rule of law without republican government,
and no liberty without the law.
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